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Abstract
This paper examines religious practices of  Ammatoans professed to be 
“Islamic” by practitioners, but ethnocentrically understood as “animistic” in 
Tylorian sense by scholars. Scholars have argued that Ammatoans’ practices 
are incompatible with Islam. Islam and animism are mutually exclusive. This 
paper, in contrast, argues that Islam and animism are all encompassing. To 
build the argument, this paper firstly elaborates scholars’ revisited theory of  
animism that argues for the (indigenous) notion of  personhood as not limited 
only to human beings, but extended to non-human beings: land, forest, trees, 
animals and so forth. Secondly, this paper reviews the Quranic verses that 
explicate the personhood of  non-human beings, and finally Ammatoans’ 
practices –visits to forest, refusal of  electricity installation and others– as 
ethically responsible and mutually beneficial acts that ensure the well-beings 
of  both human and non-human beings (interpersonal relations). These 
presentations show how Ammatoans exemplify being Muslim in animistic ways.
[Artikel ini membahas praktik keagamaan masyarakat Ammatoa, yang 
menurut pelakunya disebut “Islamic”, tetapi menurut ahli etnografi sering 
disebut animistik, karena tidak sesuai dengan ajaran Islam. Islam dan 
animisme saling menafikan. Namun hasil penelitian ini membuktikan lain, 
Islam and animisme saling terkait dan saling mengisi. Untuk mengawali 
pembahasan, dipaparkan pandangan para ahli mengenai konsep “baru” 
anismisme yang memandang konsep dasar tentang diri tidak hanya terbatas 
pada manusia, tetapi juga mencakup selain manusia: tanah, hutan, pohon, 
hewan, dan lain-lain. Ayat-ayat al-Quran juga memperkenalkan adanya 
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konsep diri bagi selain manusia. Baru kemudian dibahas mengenai praktik-
praktik masyarakat Amatoa, seperti masuk hutan, menolak instalasi listrik, 
dan lainnya, yang merupakan tanggung jawab moral serta bermanfaat bagi 
kehidupan, baik bagi manusia maupun selain manusia dalam konteks 
hubungan interpersonal. Paparan ini menunjukkan corak khas masyarakat 
Ammatoa untuk menjadi seorang muslim dalam cara yang animistik.]
Keywords: local Islam, animism, religious personhood, interpersonal 
relation. 
A. Introduction
This paper examines Ammatoans’ religious practices1 as professed 
to be “Islamic” by practitioners but contested as “animistic” by scholars. 
In academia and public discourse, Islam and animism are perceived to 
be distinctive and contradictive: they are mutually exclusive. A Muslim 
cannot be an animist, and vice versa. Once an animist converts to Islam, 
he or she must leave his/her animistic belief  and practices. Otherwise, 
he or she would commit hypocrisy and heresy.  
Since their first contact with Islam in the seventeenth century, 
Ammatoans have professed to be Muslim but continued practicing 
their (pre-Islamic) traditional practices, regardless of  several spiteful and 
continual pressures by the state and outsiders. Those practices are the 
means and objectives for their collective identity reproduction. Their 
collective identity is built on the basis of  interpersonal relationships 
among a wide range of  beings including the land, trees, mountains and 
animals, as well as humans. For scholars working on Ammatoans like 
Penard,2 Renre,3 Usop,4 and Rossler,5 Ammatoans’ religious practices are 
syncretic: Islam and Ammatoans’ “animistic” tradition come together and 
1 Ammatoa is a minority Konjo-speaking community of  approximately 4600 
people living in the southeast uplands of  South Sulawesi, Indonesia.
2 W.A. Penard, “‘De Patuntung’ of  South Sulawesi, Malakaji”, Tijdschrift voor 
Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, vol. 55 (1913), pp. 515–43.
3 Abdullah Renre, Patuntung di Kecamatan Sinjai Barat (Ujung Pandang: Institut 
Agama Islam Negeri Alauddin, 1978).
4 K.M. Usop, Pasang ri Kajang: Kajian Sistem Nilai di “Benteng Hitam” Amma Toa 
(Ujung Pandang: Pusat Latihan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial UNHAS, 1978). 
5 Martin Rössler, “Striving for Modesty: Fundamentals of  the religion and social 
organization of  the Makassarese Patuntung”, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 
vol. 146, no. 2 (1990), p.  289–324. 
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shape a new religious practice,6 but the traditional ones are gradually going 
to become extinct.7 For the state, the profession to be Muslim is a way to 
lead the (“uncivilized”) Ammatoans to modernity. Ammatoans’ traditional 
practices compatible with Islam and series of  the state programs are for 
the state to be preserved for tourist interests. For orthodox Muslims, 
Ammatoans’ religious practices are hypocritical and/or heretical because 
Islam and animism are mixed in practices. For them, the Ammatoans 
worship God but they also worship ‘natural forces.’ 
In contrast, this paper shows that Islam and animism are not 
only complementary but also all-encompassing. Based on Ammatoans’ 
religious phenomenon, this paper demonstrates that it is a misperception 
to essentially understand Islam and animism as mutually exclusive. To 
construct the argument, this paper refers to Nurit Bird-David’s “Animism 
Revisited”8 in that she argues that animism should be understood as a 
relational epistemology. Bird-David demonstrates that the Western 
scholarship has misleadingly advocated that animism is a failed 
epistemology and Western scholars therefore have misunderstood that 
indigenous people’s animistic epistemology fails to understand their 
world. Bird-David proves that Western scholars have ethnocentrically 
limited the notion of  personhood to human beings only when discussing 
indigenous peoples’ lives. In contrast to Western perception, Bird-David 
advocates, indigenous peoples like the Nayaka of  India extend the notion 
of  personhood to non-human beings. Through the indigenous notion of  
personhood, as this paper will show, Ammatoans observe their religious 
practices by locating Islam and animism (the indigenous religion) together. 
Based on Bird-David’s concept of  animism that this paper 
interprets Ammatoans’ religious practices, especially those related to 
their interactions with the forest, trees, land, and animals. Ammatoans’ 
religiosity is predicated on the assumption that all of  these beings are 
equal social actors. Unlike conventional interpretations on interactions 
6 This theory is, however, questionable for several reasons. 1) Ethnographically, 
the Ammatoa indigenous religion still persists in its own shape. So, it is rather 
dissimilation than syncretic. 2) In term of  practice, Islam does not replace the indigenous 
ones and the absence of  Islamic elements does not invalidate Ammatoan practices, and 
3) syncretism often implies “impurity”.
7 Interestingly, researchers and scholars from 1913 up to present time all refer to 
the same practices where Islam and the indigenous religion are both present. This fact 
signifies that since the contact with Islam, the Ammatoan practices continue to play. 
8 Nurit Bird-David, “‘Animism’ Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and 
Relational Epistemology”, Current Anthropology, vol. 40, no. S1 (Feb 1999), pp. 67–91.
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between Ammatoans with other beings, such as “worship” and, therefore, 
heretical or hypocritical (mushrik), this paper interprets that Ammatoans’ 
(religious) ways of  relating to their environment is “interpersonal.” 
Drawing insights of  Bird-David,9 Hallowell10 and Morrison,11 this paper 
argues that Ammatoans visit their forest because they perceive that the 
forest helps the well-being of  Ammatoans. Their religious system based 
on personhood perception requires them to refrain from activities that 
may harm or offend other beings. They must avoid activities such as 
constructing paved roads or using electricity in their territory. 
Islam, for Ammatoans, is a source of  knowledge of  how to perceive 
the world interpersonally. In what follows, this paper presents the notion 
of  personhood from both indigenous and Quranic perspectives. This 
paper argues that both sources in discussing the notion of  personhood 
correspond to one another respectively. At the end, this paper uses these 
two perspectives in interpreting Ammatoans’ practices and argues that 
Ammatoans’ practices are animistic Islam.
B. Defining Personhood: Indigenous Perspectives.
In contrast to Western sciences that perceive personhood as 
identical with human,12 indigenous perception extends personhood 
not only to human beings but also to non-human beings such as 
animals, trees, mountains, stones, thunder, and so forth. To construct 
an indigenous definition of  ‘personhood,’ I build on the work of  three 
scholars (Hallowell, Morrison, and Bird-David). Hallowell argues that 
the Ojibwa cosmos is occupied by persons: both human and non-human 
beings. Hallowell accounts the kinship term, grandfather, to establish the 
perspective in that he finds that the term grandfather is not only applied 
to human persons but also to a category of  non-human persons.13 
Hallowell explains that the non-human grandfathers are sources of  
power in that they share with human beings and therefore enhance the 
9 Ibid. 
10 A. Irving Hallowell, “Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View”, in Teaching 
from the American Earth: Indian Religion and Philosophy, ed. by T.B. Tedlock (New York: 
Liveright, 1960), pp. 17–49.
11 Kenneth Morrison, “The Cosmos as Intersubjective: Native American Other-
Than-Human Persons”, in Indigenous Religions: A Companion, ed. by Graham Harvey 
(New York: Cassell, 2000), pp. 23–36.
12 Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes (eds.), The Category of  the 
Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
13 Hallowell, “Ojibwa Ontology”, p. 144. 
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power of  human beings.14 He conceptualizes personhood as the principal 
Ojibwa ontological category that is found in the Algonkian language, 
oral tradition, metamorphosis, and dreaming. In dreams, for example, 
Hallowell ascertains that the Ojibwa have direct encounters with other 
non-human persons. For non-human persons, Hallowell writes:
Like myself, they have personal identity, autonomy, and volition. I cannot 
always predict exactly how they will act, although most of  the time their 
behavior meets my expectations. In relation to myself, other ‘persons’ 
vary in power. Many of  them have more power than I have, but some 
have less. They may be friendly and help me when I need them but, at the 
same time, I have to be prepared for hostile acts, too. I must be cautious in 
my relations with other ‘persons’ because appearances may be deceptive.15
Hallowell contends that the category ‘person’ is central to 
understanding the Ojibwa cosmos. He argues that the Ojibwa concept 
of  personhood includes both human and non-human beings such as 
stones, lightning, and thunder. To support his argument, Hallowell closely 
examines the grammatical structure of  Ojibwa language that formally 
expresses a distinction between “animate” and “inanimate” nouns and 
concludes that the substantives for some --but not all-- trees, sun and 
moon, thunder, stones and other material culture such as certain kettles 
and certain pipes are classified as animate.16 Hallowell, however, argues 
that the Ojibwa are not animists in the sense that they dogmatically 
attribute living souls to inanimate objects, such as stones.17 Hallowell 
demonstrates that these beings constitute personhood through a crucial 
test in experience or encounter.18 Hallowell explicates that the recognition 
of  animacy, thus personhood, is based on interaction between beings, 
be they humans or non-humans through dreams and visions. Hallowell 
discovers that the Ojibwa conceive thunder birds as acting like human 
beings: they hunt, talk and dance.19  He also learns that in their daily 
life the Ojibwa behavior towards certain plants and animals is culturally 
structured in that they deal with persons who understand what is being 
said to them and have volitional capacities as well.20 In short, Hallowell 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 168. 
16 Ibid., p. 146. 
17 Ibid., p. 147.
18 Ibid., p. 148.
19 Ibid., p. 157.
20 Ibid., p. 160.
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convinces that the Ojibwa live in a world transcending social relations, a 
world of  interpersonal relations among many different beings.21  
Hallowell’s theory is developed by Morrison. He develops the 
concept of  person, power, and gift for theorizing interpersonal relations 
between human and non-human persons. For Morrison, the concepts of  
person, power, and gift are interrelated: person is constituted through 
intentionality (desire, need, will, purposefulness, selfishness, selflessness) 
by different beings; plants, animal and human beings, power --the ability 
to influence other beings--  is obtained through interpersonal relations and 
gift is the ethical responsibility or the means for creating and maintaining 
interpersonal relationship.  
Morrison advocates that the Ojibwa do not define person by human 
physical shape and therefore they do not anthropomorphize.22 Morrison 
demonstrates that Ojibwa people perceive animals, plants, the Sun, Moon, 
and stars, and even ‘objects’ as persons because they behave like human 
beings do.23  He detects that behaviors and actions of  non-human persons 
are expressed in myth and lore and it is through myth and lore powerful 
persons are remembered.24 He endorses Hallowell that human and other 
beings encounter each other in dreams and visions. Morrison explains, a 
dream is a state of  consciousness bridging cosmological dimensions. In 
dreams, human persons encounter non-human persons and acknowledge 
mutual responsibility and their encounters motivate their daily life 
behaviors.25 In the Ojibwa world, Morrison accounts, human and other 
beings express mutual responsibility in a sense that respectful relations 
among persons create harmony and antagonistic relations create disorder 
such as hunger, illness and social estrangement.26 Morrison observes 
the notion of  mutual responsibility by interpreting acts of  hunting as 
mutual communication between human and animal persons: humans 
need to persuade animals to give their bodies and to convince them that 
they will reincarnate.27 Echoing Hallowell, Morrison persuades that the 
Ojibwa cosmos, inhabited by persons of  different species constitutes a 
relational, behavioral and social system.28  
21 Ibid., p. 167.
22 Morrison, “The Cosmos”, p. 76. 
23 Ibid., p. 77. 
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 78
26 Ibid., p. 77. 
27 Ibid., p. 78.
28 Ibid., p. 77.
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Morrison goes on to show that interpersonal relationships among 
beings is the source of  power29 and, therefore, recognizing other persons 
and exercising the relationship with them is necessary. As a result of  his 
comparison on Hallowell’s and Blackburn’s,30 Morrison discovers that 
both the Ojibwa and Chumash orient to other beings as kinfolk, and kin 
status which defines power, privilege, and responsibility among beings.31 
In Ojibwa and Chumash’s perception, non-human persons present 
themselves as kinfolk, empower human beings through dreams and 
visions, and engage themselves in human daily life activities.32 Morrison 
advocates that kinship encompassing humans and non-humans is 
paramount for Native Americans.33 He furthermore argues that it is 
because the Native American cosmos is inhabited by persons, they locate 
power in the interplay of  all sorts of  persons and hence the notion of  
causality and personal intentionality are synonymous: the land having 
emerged is the purposeful action of  their culture’s hero, Nanabozho, 
nights and days and the course of  seasons are the intentional actions of  
Winter, Summer, sun, moon and stars. As a result, all beings: bird, animals, 
as well as humans reveal similar purposeful interaction.34 Through these 
perceptions, Morrison argues, the Ojibwa shape their practical life ways.35 
In relation to the concept of  gift, Morrison demonstrates that in 
Native American religious life, power is always conceived as a gift that 
forges solidarity.36 Morrison states that in order to achieve human well-
being, the Ojibwa and other Native Americans should engage in gifting 
acts that ensure the well-being of  other beings.37 Morrison states that it 
is for the gifting that rituals are observed and, therefore, rituals revolve 
around relational concerns. Morrison then convincingly argues that “ritual 
contextualizes human and non-human interaction” (Morrison 2000; 
85). Through the triangle concepts: person, power and gift, Morrison 
persuades that the religious life of  Native Americans is concerned with 
moral behavior and cosmic meaning through mutual responsibility and 
29 Ibid., p. 80.
30 Thomas C. Blackburn and Kat Anderson (eds.), Before the Wilderness: 
Environmental Management by Native Californians (Menlo Park, CA: Ballena Press, 1993).
31 Morrison, “The Cosmos”, p. 79. 
32 Ibid., p. 77.
33 Ibid., p. 84.
34 Ibid., p. 82.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 85.
37 Ibid.
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interpersonal relationship among beings. 
Having learned the ways of  living of  Nayaka, India, especially 
related to the idea of  devaru, Bird-David develops the concept of  sharing 
and relating among the Nayaka. In so doing, Bird-David focuses on 
Nayaka perception of  personhood. Bird-David demonstrates that devaru 
is a ‘superperson’38 manifesting in different beings such as stones, rocks, 
animals, plants, etc. Bird-David accounts Nayaka perception that some 
elephants and rocks are devaru and some are just elephants and rocks. 
Bird-David persuades that a being constitutes devaru when she shares and 
relates and it is through sharing and relating that personhood is mutually 
recognized by both fellow Nayaka and members of  other species living 
in their environment. Bird-David advocates that preserving relationships 
and sharing activities among beings are critical to Nayaka identity because 
it is through those ways they maintain their personhood. Bird-David states 
that the Nayaka people establish their personhood by producing and 
reproducing their sharing relationship with surrounding beings, human 
and non-human others. Bird-David provides ethnographic data that show 
the Nayaka perceive the people (avaru) and other species --animals, plants, 
or other beings (devaru) as relatives or kinfolk (nama sonta = our family): 
they are in some contexts absorbed into one “we-ness”. The notion of  
we-ness is exercised in devaru performances in which Nayaka people invite, 
relate and share with devaru (other beings presenting intention, desire, 
and will for sharing and relationship). Devaru performances are, in other 
words, the means to make known avaru-devaru relatedness. 
Furthermore, Bird-David demonstrates that the Nayaka live 
in a social environment by conceiving themselves as ‘dividual’ rather 
than individual. She develops the concept of  dividual to justify the 
uniqueness of  the Nayaka way of  life distinctive from Euro-American 
individual. Bird-David explains that dividual is “a person constitutive of  
relationship”.39 To make sense of  the concept of  dividual, Bird-David 
explores the verb “dividuate”: 
When I individuate a human being I am conscious of  her “in herself ” (as 
a single separate entity); when I dividuate her I am conscious of  how she 
relates with me. … I am conscious of  the relatedness with my interlocutor 
38 She contrasts this term with Hallowell’s other-than-human person. She 
chooses ‘superperson’ because she argues that other-than-human person falls under 
class category and therefore still conserves objective notions; Bird-David, “‘Animism’ 
Revisited”, p. 74.
39 Ibid., p. 72.
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as I engage with her, attentive to what she does in relation to what I do, to 
how she talks and listens to me as I talk and listen to her, to what happens 
simultaneously and mutually to me, to her, to us.40
By dividual perception, argues Bird-David, the Nayaka sense a 
person as whom they relate and share with. That sense of  personhood, 
thus, applies not only to humans but also to non-humans. For Bird-David, 
dividual is emergent, constituted by relationships, not given and must be 
worked out through social processes.41 
To conclude, the three scholars agree that animists do not limit the 
notion of  personhood to humans only but also extend it to non-human 
beings. This notion of  personhood is also shared by Ammatoans. They 
practice Islam through the exercise of  their animistic notion as this paper 
argues. In the following, I examine the Quranic accounts that relate to 
non-human beings in order to justify the argument that the animistic 
perception of  personhood corresponds to the Quranic accounts. This 
paper finally presents Ammatoans’ religious practices as exemplifying 
being Muslim in animistic ways. 
C. The Personhood of  ‘non-Humans’ in the Quran
Though it is controversial, I advocate that the animistic perspective 
of  personhood is prevalent in the Quran. Both scholars and Muslims 
assume that human beings are better than or superior to any other beings. 
This assumption limits personhood to human only. Foltz for example 
shows that the Quran itself  depicts humans as occupying a special and 
privileged status. Foltz refers to the Quranic verses that declare that 
human is the best creature (95: 4), animals is for human benefits (22: 
65; 16: 5-8, 12, 14; 6:142), eating animal flesh is allowed (5:1; 6: 145; 16: 
5, 66; 40: 79), and slaughtering animals is lawful (5:3; 2: 173; 6: 145). In 
addition to those verses, Foltz documents that the Quran repeatedly 
mentions the words of  faḍḍalnā (we made them to excel the others), 
karramnā (we made them more gracious), ja‘ala lakum (we created them 
for you), ḥamalnā (we bring them for you), and the like that are all for 
human superiority. Referring to different sources of  Islam: the Quran, 
the Hadith, the Islamic law, Islamic philosophy and science, Foltz argues 
that in all these expressions of  Muslim culture, animals are valued mainly 
for the service they provide for humans, though sometimes animals could 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 73. 
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provide lessons which human can draw from them. 42
1. Conceptualizing Khalīfa (Stewardship): the Superiority of  Human Beings
To begin the discussion, I examine first the established Quranic 
interpretation of  stewardship in which most Muslims contend the 
superiority of  humans over other beings. In the Quran, the word khalīfa, 
together with its derivation (khulafā’ and khalaifa), is mentioned nine 
times: 2: 30; 6: 165; 7: 69, 74; 10: 14, 73; 27: 62; 35: 39; 38: 26. Two verses 
refer to an individual: 2: 30 (Adam) and 38: 26 (Daud/David), three 
verses refer to a certain group: 7: 69 (a people coming after the people 
of  Noah), 7: 74 (a group of  people coming after the people of  ‘Ad), and 
10: 73 (the people of  Noah), and four verses refer to all humankind: 6: 
165; 10: 14; 27: 62; and 35: 39. In the English translations of  the Quran, 
the word khalīfa has been translated with several meanings. Yusuf  Ali 
uses vicegerent, agent, inheritor and heir in his translation. Muhammad 
Asad uses inheritor, heir, successor and vicegerent. Picktall only uses 
viceroy to translate the nine verses of  khalifa. Shakir translates khalīfa 
with successor and ruler and al-Hilali and Khan translate the word as 
generation, successor and inheritor. 
Al-Zamakhshāry, in his al-Kashshāf, al-Shaukāny in his Tafsīr Fatḥ al-
Qadīr, Ibn Kathīr in his Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm, all agree in interpreting the 
word khalīfa as “successor” or “the one who substitutes the others” or “a 
group substitutes other groups”. In interpreting the word khalīfa as used 
in 2:30 for instance, they agree that Adam as the khalīfa of  God replaces 
angels on the earth. Unlike the two other interpreters, al-Zamakhshary 
implies that the status of  khalīfa as successor is given to Adam in his 
capacity as the prophet and therefore all other prophets carry the status 
of  khalifa. In other words, al-Zamakhshary would argue that the status of  
khalīfa is not given to all human beings but rather to only certain people 
whom God has chosen to carry about. 
In conceptualizing khalifa, the Quranic commentators do not only 
take the nine verses of  khalīfa but also relate to some other Quranic 
verses and the prophet’s Hadiths. In doing so, their references to other 
verses and Hadiths determine their assessment of  what khalīfa means. In 
this paper, I choose only those who have concerns with environmental 
issues in constructing the theory of  khalīfa. My goal is to point out that 
despite a strong assumption privileging humans over other beings, there 
42 Richard Foltz, Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2006), p. 4.
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have been concerns among Muslim scholars with the issue being under 
discussion. Some of  them, as we shall see, however, do not fully account 
the personhood of  non-humans.
Al-Damkhi defines khalīfa as “one who takes over a position, a 
power, a trust, and who holds it reliably and in harmony with its grantor 
(Allah/God)”.43 Al-Damkhi defines the verbal root of  khalīfa, khalāf, as 
‘he came after, followed, succeeded.’ Al-Damkhi argues that Adam, the 
prophet and the progenitor of  the human race was appointed by God as 
khalīfa on earth. Consequently, argues al-Damkhi, every man or woman 
has inherited power and accountability in relation to the earth’s resources 
and all its life forms.44 Supporting his argument, al-Damkhi refers to the 
17: 70. In interpreting 2:30, al-Damkhi, however, argues that the khalīfa 
was seen to break the rule and violate the trust, and showed himself  
unworthy to be preferred over other beings. For al-Damkhi, only because 
do human beings violate the rule and trust of  being khalīfa, human 
beings are not superior. Al-Damkhi furthermore relates the notion of  
khalīfa to the concept of  amāna (trust) by referring to 33: 72. The Quran 
33: 72, according to al-Damkhi, implies that God offered the trust to 
human beings and they accepted the responsibility with their abilities of  
choosing their relative free will, and thus human beings gain the capacity 
to live for good and evil. Being a khalīfa on earth, al-Damkhi explains, 
man must fulfill the amāna (trust) through acting truthfully in agreement 
with God’s laws.45 Al-Damkhi contests human superiority over others, but 
only in conditional ways. If  conditions like amāna are fulfilled, humans 
deserve superiority.
Similarly, by referring to verses in which God subjugates (sakhkhara) 
the sun and moon, day and night, the rivers and the sea, and indeed 
everything for humans (14:33, 16:12, 29: 61, 31:29, 35:13, 39:5; 14:33, 
16:12; 14:32; 16:14; 31:20, 45:13), Yasin Dutton argues that all humankind 
as the children of  Adam share the attribute of  khalifa -dom as being 
God’s deputy or representative on Earth. For Dutton, God has created 
everything for humans as gifts and therefore humans are free to use the 
good things of  the earth. To treat those gifts, Dutton, however, argues 
that humans are bounded with their ‘abd-ness (servanthood), which is to 
43 Ali Mohamed Al-Damkhi, “Environmental ethics in Islam: principles, 
violations, and future perspectives”, International Journal of  Environmental Studies, vol. 
65, no. 1 (Feb 2008), p. 16.
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 17.
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follow the laws of  God.46 In Dutton’s accounts to say in short, human 
superiority is conditional. Just like al-Damkhi, when humans fulfill the 
conditions of  ‘abd-ness, they become superior.  Personhood does not 
belong to other beings because they are all under control of  human 
beings. For Dutton, the condition of  other beings is dependent on 
human beings’ control. 
Focusing specifically on the Quran, 6: 165, Saadia Khawar Khan 
Chisti, along with Dutton, argues that the Quran establishes a position 
for humans in the physical world as one of  vicegerent, or steward, of  
creation. In the sharia, the earth, Chisti advocates, is presented to the 
vicegerent as a “usufruct” with attendant duties of  maintenance and 
if  possible, improvement for the benefit of  the coming descendent 
generations. Chisti states that humankind is responsible for the survival 
and good condition of  the various communities on the earth.47 Up to 
this point, al-Damkhi, Dutton, and Chisti still account human beings as 
superior over other beings. They all advocate human superiority, despite 
their contestation on it, and so fail to recognize the personhood of  other 
beings. 
Citing the Quran, 6:38 and 16: 68, Chisti, unlike al-Damkhi and 
Dutton, argues that the Quran highlights the need for human sensitivity 
to its co-inhabitants (non-human beings) of  the earth because Allah also 
communicates with them.48 It seems that Chisti realizes the notion of  
interdependence among living communities: humans and non-humans. 
In this context, Chisti goes on, every life-form possesses intrinsic value 
dependent of  its resource worth to humanity.49 Chisti argues that as 
vicegerents, humans are obligated to balance their needs with the needs 
of  the other communities and species that come under their care and 
responsibility. To do so, everyone is bounded by individual knowledge 
and by individual capacity.50 Even though Chisti privileges the superiority 
46 Yasin Dutton, “The Environmental Crisis of  Our Time: A Muslim Response”, 
in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Richard C. Foltz, Denny Frederick 
Mathewson, and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity School, 2003), 
pp. 8–9.
47 Saadia Khawar Khan Chishti, “Fitra: An Islamic Model for Human and the 
Environment”, in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Richard C. Foltz, Denny 
Frederick Mathewson, and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity 
School, 2003), pp. 75–6.
48 Ibid., p. 76.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 75-6.
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of  human beings over other beings in theorizing khalīfa, he seems to 
implicitly recognize the personhood of  non-human beings because for 
him non-human species have their own needs, desires, and will. 
Echoing Chisti and referring to Quran, 95, Othman Abd-ar-
Rahman Llewellyn argues that it is an honor for humans to be khalīfa 
because they are created ‘in the best of  forms,’ that is, with the greatest 
potential for good. Llewellyn’s interpretation is here significant because 
many Muslims would interpret aḥsan taqwīm as ‘the best creation.’ 
For Llewellyn, if  we are not aware of  the potential or do not carry it 
accordingly, our status is even ‘lower than the low.’ Llewellyn states 
that khalīfa is not a privilege, but a trust, a responsibility, and a trial that 
other beings such as heavens, the earth, and the mountains refused to 
bear: In managing (or interacting with) the earth, humans have proven 
themselves thoroughly unjust and foolish (33: 72) or broken the trust. 
In the Day of  Judgment, Llewellyn argues, this khalīfa will be a source 
of  both pride to those who fulfill it and shame to these who break it. 
To be a khalīfa, for Llewellyn, is to serve and not to receive.51 Llewellyn 
insists that humans will not fulfill the trust of  being khalīfa unless the 
horizons of  care extend through space and time to embrace all other 
species, individuals, and generations of  beings. Only through extending 
the care would humans be khalīfa on the earth.52 Unlike the previous 
scholars, Llewellyn explicitly provides insight that being khalīfa is to 
perceive interpersonal relationship among beings. 
To follow Llewellyn’s argument, I argue that the extension of  the 
care requires recognition of  others’ needs and dues. This argument comes 
along with Sayyed Hossein Nasr’s argument of  khalīfa in which Nasr 
relates the concept with ḥaqq and ‘abd. Nasr advocates that each being 
exists by virtue of  the truth (ḥaqq) and has its due (ḥaqq) according to its 
nature: animals, trees and mountains have their own dues. Nasr argues 
that in interacting with nature, human beings must respect and pay what 
is due to each being, and all beings have their rights accordingly. For Nasr, 
Islam stands totally against the perception that human beings have all 
the rights and other beings have only what human beings decide to give 
them. For Nasr, it is God who has given the rights to beings (human 
51 Othman Abd-ar-Rahman Llewellyn, “An Islamic Model for Human and the 
Environment”, in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Richard C. Foltz, Denny 
Frederick Mathewson, and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity 
School, 2003), p. 190.
52 Ibid., p. 191.
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and non-humans) and therefore human beings have no right to take 
away the ḥaqq of  various beings.53 Before God, human and non-humans 
have their own rights as well as responsibilities. Nasr contends that the 
Quran speaks of  human beings as both servant of  God (‘abd Allah) and 
vicegerents of  God (khalīfat Allah) and both concepts have to be carried 
together at any time and place. Nasr argues that humans have the right 
to practice their vicegerency on the earth only on their status as God’s 
servants (‘abd) obeying His will and His Laws. Humans’ rights (ḥuqūq) 
over nature must follow their responsibilities toward God and the nature.54 
Similarly, Haq argues that humanity commits to follow God’s 
sharia, his way, which is not given to humanity as a fully articulated 
body of  laws, but rather spread all over God’s signs (āya) in the form of  
indicators with probative value (adilla). For Haq, the term āya appoints 
not only the Quranic verses but also the phenomena and the objects 
of  the natural world. The natural world, Haq concludes, is a bona fide 
source for the understanding (fiqh) of  sharia, and therefore cannot be 
considered subservient to human beings.55 Although both Nasr and Haq 
do not elaborate God’s Will or Law, we could discern an insight that parts 
of  what they mean by God’s Law or Will is to recognize and respect 
other beings’ dues (ḥuqūq): desires, needs, intentions, and anything that 
constitutes personhood.
Nasr goes on to argue that nature is not there only for human 
use. The existence of  the nature is to reflect the creative Power of  God. 
Human beings are created to be a channel of  grace for the cosmic 
atmosphere around them, and so do other beings for human beings. For 
Nasr, creatures in the world of  nature not only have a relation with human 
beings and through them with God, but they also have a direct relation 
with God and possess an eschatological significance. Nasr contends that 
the Islamic paradise is full of  animals and plants and is not only crystalline. 
According to Nasr, creatures will speak directly to God in the Day of  
Judgment56 as they also receive revelation (waḥy). Furthermore, Nasr 
53 Sayyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the 
Environmental Crisis”, in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Richard C. Foltz, 
Denny Frederick Mathewson, and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard 
Divinity School, 2003), p. 97.
54 Ibid.
55 S. Nomanul Haq, “Islam and Ecology: Toward Retrieval and Construction”, in 
Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Richard C. Foltz, Denny Frederick Mathewson, 
and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity School, 2003), p. 130.
56 Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary”, p. 96.
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argues that the nature: be they animals, trees, plants, and mountains, is 
the abode of  “spiritual” presence and source for the understanding and 
contemplation of  divine wisdom. Humans’ need for nature therefore is 
not merely to feed and shelter their physical bodies, but also and above 
all to nurture their well-being. For Nasr, as the complement to the Quran 
as revelation, the nature is there for humans’ well-being.57 For him, 
interdependency of  both humans and non-humans is sunnatullāh (God’s 
Law) and to exercise it is necessary for the well-being of  both parties. 
Compared with other scholars, Nasr provides the strongest insight that 
both human and non-human beings could be ‘person.’
2. Non-Human Beings are Muslims
Another issue to examine the Quranic perspective on personhood 
is muslim-ness of  non-humans. I contend that the nature or all beings are 
muslim. Referring to the Quran 51:56, Muslims believe that the creation 
of  human beings is to serve God. Saba Mahmoud58 learns from Muslim 
women in Egypt that their ritual ṣalāt (the five times daily prayers) is 
both means and ends which means that prayers is the means to reach the 
goal of  being Muslim and also is itself  the destination of  being Muslim 
because ṣalāt is what they believe to be the reason God creates humans. 
Based on this Muslim women’s perception as explained by Mahmoud, I 
argue that the personhood of  a Muslim is seen and valued through his/
her acts of  serving God. 
The other way is to examine what means to be muslim because 
being muslim (taking the word “muslim” as a person who commits to 
islam) itself  constitutes personhood. I take the word muslim and islam 
differently from Muslim and Islam (with capital M and I respectively). 
The former constitutes the inclusive meaning, which refers to any person 
who commits serious relationship with God and the letter refers to the 
exclusive meaning, which refers to the followers of  Islam founded by 
the prophet Muhammad.
Ibrahim Ozdemir explains that muslim comes from the word islam, 
and the word islam derives from s-l-m, which means “to be safe,” “to be 
whole and integral”,”not to be disintegrated”.59 Fazlur Rahman explains 
57 Ibid. 
58 Saba Mahmood, Politics of  Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
59 Ibrahim Ozdemir, “Toward an Understanding of  Environmental Ethics from 
a Qur’anic Perspective”, in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Denny Frederick 
164 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014 M/1435 H
Samsul Maarif
that the fundamental idea of  being muslim is to “accept,” “submit,” and 
“surrender” to the Law of  God.60 Taking this definition, I then hold that 
muslim includes not only humans but also non-humans, for all beings: 
humans and non-humans accept the Law and Will of  God. Abdul Aziz 
Said and Nathan C. Funk argue that all beings: human and non-human 
beings share in the existential condition of  submission to the Divine. 
They contend that all creatures are necessarily muslim because, consciously 
or unconsciously, they observe the will of  Allah61 that encompasses 
natural law.  
Needless to say that those above arguments are Quranic based. To 
follow them, I construct the argument that what constitutes to be muslim 
is to accept the Law of  God, which could mean both sharia and what so-
called sunnat Allah and to worship God. As repeatedly mentioned in the 
Quran that the heaven and the earth, and all beings living in or in between 
glorify (57:1; 59:1; 61:1; 17:44; 24:41; 59:24; 62:1; 64:1) and prostrate to 
God (13:15; 16: 48, 49; 22: 18), 62 it is necessary to argue that according 
to the Quran the whole cosmos is muslim. The Quran even gives some 
details about other beings that glorify God such as mountains and birds 
(21:79; 38:18), thunder (13:13), stars and trees (55:6). To this point, I 
argue that muslim-ness, which is to accept, submit, and surrender to God’s 
sharia or Law, constitutes personhood of  all creatures. Both humans 
and non-humans share muslim-ness (and thus personhood) through the 
acceptance and submission to the law of  God (sharia). 
That some people are not muslim is because they disbelieve or 
refuse to follow God’s Law or sharia and therefore they destroy their 
personhood. Some might argue that because of  humans’ relative free 
choice of  believing or disbelieving God, or following or transgressing 
God’s sharia, humans are the agents of  themselves. Although agency 
Mathewson and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity School, 2003), 
p. 34. 
60 Fazlur Rahman, “Some Key Ethical Concepts of  the Qur’an”, The Journal of  
Religious Ethics, vol. 11, no. 2 (1983), p. 183.
61 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk, “Peace in Islam: An Ecology of  
the Spirit”, in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, ed. by Richard C. Foltz, Frederick 
Mathewson Denny, and Azizan Haji Baharuddin (Cambridge: Harvard Divinity School, 
2003), p. 157.
62 Abdullah Yusuf  Ali notes that the word ma connotes inanimate beings and 
man refers to animate or living beings. Since both words are used in the Qur’an, both 
inanimate and living beings are worshipping God; Abdullah Yusuf  Ali, The Meaning of  
the Holy Qur’an: New Edition with Revised Translation, Commentary, and Newly Compiled Index, 
10th ed. (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 2003). 
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is beyond the issue in this paper, it could be argued that if  agency is 
conceived as being able to choose (to accept or to refuse), non-human 
beings: the heaven, the earth and mountains are also agents because the 
Quran also speaks so. The Quran, 33: 72, for example, states that the 
heaven, the earth, and the mountains refused to accept amāna (a trust 
or a certain responsibility), which was then offered to human beings. 
Also, the Quran, 59: 21, declares that a mountain would be humble had 
the Quran been offered to it.  Humbleness is a state of  which a muslim 
should pursue and exercise. 
This notion of  muslim-ness is the paradigm I bear to read the 
Quranic verses that are questionably interpreted to give superiority to 
human over other beings. Yusuf  Ali63 translates the word s-kh-r, which 
is mentioned twenty one times in the Quran64 as “subject” (God makes 
them subject or God subjects them to you --human beings for use). 
Yusuf  Ali understands those verses as the benefits for humans to fulfill 
their needs by using all other beings. Unlike Yusuf  Ali, I argue, to the 
contrary, that the word s.kh.r. connotes that God has made the ways of  
non-humans: the sun, moon, stars, mountains, sea, land, the heaven, the 
wind, and so forth,  showing their intentionality and purposeful actions 
understandable to humans for mutual interaction. That everything 
follows a course as mentioned in the Quran (31:29; 35:13; 39:5; 38:36) 
is for all beings: human and non-humans to recognize the intentionality, 
responsibility, needs, desires, dues, and personhood of  each other. Now, 
through the examination of  the Quranic concept of  stewardship and 
muslim-ness, I prove that this Quranic perspective corresponds to the 
indigenous perspective of  personhood. 
D. Animistic Practices of  Islam: the Ammatoans of  Sulawesi, 
Indonesia
I state in the beginning that Islam and animism are all encompassing. 
After constructing the Quranic perspective of  personhood that 
corresponds to indigenous perspective, here I re-interpret some religious 
activities of  Ammatoans that have been ethnocentrically claimed to be 
“animistic” (belief  in spirit) by both scholars and Muslim outsiders. For 
63 Ibid. 
64 The Sun and moon: 13:2; 14:33; 29: 61; 31:29; 35:13; 39:5, Ship: 14: 32, days 
and nights: 14:32: 14: 33, nights and days, sun and moon: 16:12, the sea: 16: 14; 45:12, all 
creatures in the earth and in the heaven: 22:65; 31:20; 45:13, livestock: 43:13, mountains 
and birds: 21:79; 38:18, the wind: 38: 36; 69:7, and camels: 22:36, 37.
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practitioner themselves, however, those religious activities are what they 
have to religiously perform as Muslim (and of  course as Ammatoan). 
Those activities and performances of  Ammatoans under questions 
are both the collective and individual activities. For collective events, 
activities and performances consist of  series of  rituals: 1) panganroang 
(“invocation”) which is conducted when Ammatoans have a long dry 
season, the harvest is not successful, or someone transgresses their 
adat (tradition). Ammatoans perform panganroang in a certain site called 
Tombolo in their forest and visit the site every year; 2) thanksgiving, 
which is conducted in another site called Possi’tana Sapo (the center of  
the earth) in their forest. They perform this ritual after their harvest. They 
also visit Possiktana Sapo three times in a year to solve their problems; 
3) rites of  passages that consists of  dallek mbuak (sunrise) or ritual of  
birth, akkattere (cutting hair) for a baby when she or he is around 1 year 
old, circumcision, wedding ritual, and dallek sakra (sunset) or funeral. The 
funeral itself  consists of  three stages: baca doang (chanting) attended by 
family only, lajo-lajo (mourning) attended by some community members, 
and dampo (to deliver) attended by many community members, including 
a Muslim imam with animal sacrifices. In all these rituals or events, 
the recitation of  oral tradition (Pasang ri Kajang) becomes the most 
fundamental element. For individual daily life activities, they consist of  
individuals working in the field, fishing in the ocean, working in domestic 
activities such as cooking and cloth-making, which always involve the 
chanting of  their oral tradition, and wearing uniform black clothes on 
daily basis. 
Unlike other scholars who have described those practices as 
“animistic” in the sense of  belief  in spirits inhabiting the natural objects 
and as worshipping the natural objects,65 I argue, to the contrary, that those 
performances are “animistic” in the sense of  constituting interpersonal 
relationship and parallel to the Quranic accounts as elaborated above. 
Panganroang (invocation) ritual, which is conducted at least for three 
conditions, should be interpreted as Ammatoans’ ways of  relating and 
interacting with (and not worshipping) non-human beings. Long dry 
season and unsuccessful harvest are intentional actions of  other beings 
(persons) to which Ammatoans need to respond by visiting their forest 
where they negotiate the rights and responsibilities of  both parties: 
humans and non-humans. If  someone transgresses their adat (tradition 
or ethical law) that include cutting a tree(s) without replacing them, they 
65 Usop, Pasang ri Kajang; Rössler, “Striving for Modesty”. 
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also visit their forest.66 The forest they annually visit is another person 
in the Ammatoans’ perception. They perceive that forest is a source of  
life.67 From that forest, no one is allowed to take anything out: like fruits, 
trees, woods, or animals unless they notice that those coming from the 
forest offer themselves to Ammatoans.68 For instance, if  Ammatoans 
see an animal in the forest, they initiate an encounter by approaching 
the animal. Have the animal stayed in place, Ammatoans would take and 
could slaughter the animal because they perceive that the animal should 
have offered himself  as a gift to Ammatoans. If  the animal, however, 
runs, Ammatoans would not do anything but let the animal run away. 
Ammatoans do not hunt animals.69 
After having successful harvest, Ammatoans perform thanksgiving 
ritual by visiting another site called Possiktana Sapo (the center of  the 
earth) in their forest to which they visit three times in a year.70 Harvest, 
either successful or unsuccessful, is purposeful actions of  plants 
that Ammatoans respond to. In this ritual, Ammatoans bring parts 
representing of  whatever they have harvested such as rice, corn, or 
banana (cooked and uncooked) with them to Possi’tana. In Possi’tana, 
they eat the cooked ones and leave the uncooked ones. An Ammatoan 
said, “we leave them for the forest, so that we could get some back from 
the forest.” In contrast to Syamsuddin71 who interprets this statement that 
Ammatoans make offerings to “spirits” (I am still struggling to search 
for parallel word of  spirit in Indonesian and in the local Sulawesinese 
languages: Makassarese, Buginese, and Konjo of  Ammatoans) of  the 
forest, I argue instead that Ammatoans perceive the forest as a person that 
they need to share with for the well-being of  both parties. For the sake 
of  a cosmic balance, whatever Ammatoans harvest is not merely for their 
benefit, but always to share with others: both humans and non-humans.72 
66 Munirah Sirajuddin, Mencermati Makna Pesan di Kajang (Surabaya: Citra Adi 
Bangsa, 2002).
67 Ibid., pp. 52–5. 
68 Abdul Muttalib, “Arti Positif  Sikap Isolasi Masyarakat Kajang”, presented 
at the Temu Budaya Sulawesi Selatan (Ujungpandang: Kanwil Depdikbud Sulawesi 
Selatan, 1998).
69 Syamsurijal Adhan, “Islam dan Patuntung di Tanah Toa Kajang: Pergulatan 
Tiada Akhir”, in Hak Minoritas: Dilema Multikulturalisme di Indonesia, ed. by Hikmat 
Budiman (Jakarta: Interseksi Foundation, 2005).
70 Sirajuddin, Mencermati Makna.
71 Ibid. 
72 Catherine McKanzie, “Origins of  Resistance: The Construction and 
Continuity of  Identity in Tana Towa (Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, Indonesia)”, Ph.D. 
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There are several points worthy to add up to the Ammatoan notion 
of  personhood from the rites of  passages. Both ritual of  birth and funeral 
are related to the sun: the ritual of  birth is called sunrise (dallembuak) and 
funeral is called sunset (dallek sakra). Sunrise and sunset might be seen as 
merely names of  ritual. But if  we relate to their perception that the sun 
is the teacher enlightening human beings, the names are not insignificant. 
The names should have more meaning. It is a person “who” enlightens 
Ammatoans. Because of  their perception about the sun, assumingly 
their houses uniformly facing the east are for Ammatoans to welcome 
(respond the encounter with) the sun every morning. Another interesting 
fact in rites of  passage is in their wedding. Every new couple should start 
a family life with at least a couple of  livestock. Economically, livestock 
would assure the good life for a new couple who just start their new 
life or are responsible for their own life. According to their myth, the 
Ammatoaans have been living with livestock from the beginning and 
therefore livestock have become their fellows. The Ammatoan kinship 
system also embraces non-human beings. Dragons and eagles are among 
Ammatoans’ ancestors.73
Working in the field, fishing in the ocean, and working in domestic 
activities such as cooking and cloth-making, individuals always chant 
their Pasang ri Kajang (oral tradition). Pasang ri Kajang literally means 
the massages of  Kajang, the name of  an area where Ammatoans reside. 
The Pasang is the wisdom of  elders.74 The Pasang is typically short, 
poetic saying and sets out key expressions of  community ethos, strict 
prohibitions in daily life conduct, truth distilled from collective knowledge 
and experiences, specific advices or admonitions for community members. 
The Pasang encodes the entire religious, ceremonial and social system of  
Ammatoans and is handed down from generation to generation.75 The 
Pasang counsels a simple life as a virtuous life and thus simplicity is one 
of  the core teachings of  the Pasang.76 It forbids the introduction of  any 
non-traditional elements, such as electricity and schools, into Ammatoans’ 
life and it is then as the means of  channeling community practices and 
as self-representation.77 Through their chants of  the Pasang in working, 
Dissertation (Sydney: Australian National University, 1994), p. 107. 
73 Usop, Pasang ri Kajang.
74 Ibid.; Rössler, “Striving for Modesty”. 
75 McKanzie, “Origins of  Resistance”, p. 74; Usop, Pasang ri Kajang, p. 119. 
76 Samsul Maarif, “Dimensions of  Religions Practice: The Ammatoans of  
Sulawesi, Indonesia”, Ph.D. Dissertation (Arizona: Arizona State University, 2012). 
77 McKanzie, “Origins of  Resistance”, p. 54. 
169Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014 M/1435 H
Being a Muslim in Animistic Ways
Ammatoans manifest their knowledge, cultivate their daily behaviors, and 
surely communicate with those they interact with: the field rice, farms, 
and the ocean. In these individual activities, we again see how Ammatoans 
embrace the notion of  ‘indigenous’ personhood.
The last thing to examine in regard to the Ammatoan concept 
of  personhood is their unwillingness to accept modern agendas such 
as schooling, building hospitals, paving the roads, farming by modern 
technological tools, and so forth.78 On daily basis, Ammatoans wear 
uniform black clothes, no sandals or shoes, or no electricity. The 
state champion of  ‘progressiveness’ through formal educatioan and 
development of  modern technology is contested by Ammatoans. For 
Ammatoans, the best knowledge is to patuntung (seek and practice) Pasang 
ri Kajang.79 Seeking for knowledge is not through ‘formal’ schools (as 
imposed by the state) but being sabbara’ (patient), lambusu’ (honest), 
and gattang (consistent and persistent).80 Unlike the state that would 
assume health as being physically healthy, Ammatoans perceive health 
as manifesting adat (tradition) based on Pasang ri Kajang that counsels 
simplicity and ethically, politically, economically and socially governs the 
community members, including in relation to their environment. Paving 
the road is conceived unethical by Ammatoans. Ammatoans perceive 
that paving the road would offend non-human others who live in their 
environment.81 
E. Concluding Remarks
Ammatoans’ practices are both to implement their cosmological 
perception that counsels interpersonal relationship and to cultivate their 
desire to be Ammatoan: honest, consistent and persistent, and patient. 
Practices are both the ways to discipline their ‘self ’ especially in relation 
to other beings and products of  their perception about the world. 
Ammatoans do not distinguish between knowledge and practice. For 
Ammatoans, sabbara’ (patient), lambusu’ (honesty), gattang (consistency), are 
knowledge that they pursue through practices in daily basis. This notion 
is again similar to the Quranic account from the 61:3: “Grievously odious 
78 Maarif, “Dimensions of  Religions”.
79 Renre, Patuntung. 
80 Sitti Aminah, Nilai-nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Masyarakat Amma Toa Kajang 
(Ujung Pandang: Depdikbud Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan, 1989).
81 Rössler, “Striving for Modesty”, pp. 313–4.
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is it in the Sight of  God that ye say that which ye do not”.82  
For such practices, Foucault83 would argue that Ammatoans 
continually observe the “care of  the self,” “discipline the self,” and 
“transform the self ” in order for the self  to better understand and interact 
with others and the world. Going beyond Foucault’s limited account 
on personhood (or in his term ‘selfhood’) that applies to human only, 
Ammatoans take care, discipline and transform the self   in order to engage 
interpersonal relationship that produce the well-being of  persons: human 
and non-humans. For Ammatoans, the care of  the self  is not confined 
with humans only but extended to other beings. Ammatoans discipline 
and transform the self  through interaction and encounter with other 
beings: humans and non-humans. Through interaction and encounter (by 
visits, chants, or rituals), Ammatoans cultivate their mutual recognition 
and understanding with other persons and therefore mutual rights and 
responsibilities could be exercised. Furthermore, exercising interpersonal 
relationship is for Ammatoans to establish social unity of  beings. Adhan 
accounts the notion of  social unity of  beings by referring to the Pasang 
that says: ‘abbulo si pappa, allemo sibatu, tallang si pahua, manyu siparampe, and 
lingu sipakainga’ (in disperse we unite, in weakness we strengthen, in dip 
we hold up, in drift we help, and in forgetfulness we remind). Based on 
his ethnographic data, Adhan persuades that the Pasang is not only to 
address the social unity of  human beings but also that of  other beings 
living in the environment. 84
It is a challenge to argue about Ammatoans’ practices whether 
they are Quranic based or not. Historically speaking, Ammatoans have 
professed to be Muslim since 17th century. They, however, used to refuse 
bringing the Quran inside their territory. Their refusal is consulted in 
their Pasang.85 Imposed by the state, some of  their children have come to 
schools where they are taught about the Quran. Two possibilities about 
the study of  the Quran could tell. First, the study is basic: how to read 
the Quran or basic teaching of  Islam such as the Five Pillars because the 
schools are from 1st to 9th grades and they are the state (secular) schools. 
In this case, it is doubtful to argue that Ammatoans might acquire the 
82 Ali, The Meaning, p. 1460. 
83 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of  the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 
1981-1982, ed. by François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana, trans. by Graham Burchell 
(New York: Picador, 2005).
84 Adhan, “Islam dan Patuntung”, p. 263.
85 A.A. Cense, “De Patoentoengs in Het Bergland Van Kadjang”, manuscript, 
Koninklijk Instituut voor Tall-, Land- en Volkenkunde collection (1931). 
171Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014 M/1435 H
Being a Muslim in Animistic Ways
Quranic perspective of  personhood as described above just based on the 
formal educational processes. Second, the Quranic study being taught in 
schools would oppose to Ammatoans’ worldview, especially related to 
the notion of  personhood because one of  the agendas of  the schooling 
is to alienate Ammatoans from their tradition and worldview.  
 It is, however, undoubtedly to argue that Ammatoans’ ‘animistic’ 
practices are parallel to the Quranic accounts. Ammatoans’ commitment 
to engage with interpersonal relationship could be viewed as the 
application of  the Quranic notion of  huquq. In any case, Ammatoans 
profess to be Muslim and therefore they are Muslim. As a matter of  
fact, Islam, Talal Asad advocates, is discursive tradition.86 Ammatoans’ 
practices are the examples of  animistic practices of  Islam. The Ammatoan 
case shows that someone could be an animist and at the same time as a 
Muslim. Animism (the new version) and Islam are now clear that they 
are not mutually exclusive but rather complementing to one another.  
86 Quoted in Mahmood, Politics of  Piety, p. 115. 
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